

Preferential exchange: Strengthening connections in complex networks

G. Caldarelli,^{1,2} F. Coccetti,² and P. De Los Rios³

¹*INFN UdR ROMA1, Dipartimento Fisica, Università di Roma La Sapienza, Piazzale Aldo Moro 2, 00185 Roma, Italy*

²*Museo Storico della Fisica e Centro Studi e Ricerche Enrico Fermi, Compendio Viminale, 00189 Roma, Italy*

³*Laboratoire de Biophysique Statistique, ITP-SB, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland*

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Many social, technological, and biological interactions involve network relationships whose outcome intimately depends on the structure of the network and on the strengths of the connections. Yet, although much information is now available concerning the structure of many networks, the strengths are more difficult to measure. Here we show that, for one particular social network, notably the e-mail network, a suitable measure of the strength of the connections can be available. We also propose a simple mechanism, based on positive feedback and reciprocity, that can explain the observed behavior and that hints toward specific dynamics of formation and reinforcement of network connections. Network data from contexts different from social sciences indicate that power-law, and generally broad, distributions of the connection strength are ubiquitous, and the proposed mechanism has a wide range of applicability.

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Networks are the most general framework to describe technological, biological, social, and other systems. The nodes of the network (Internet routers [1], Web pages [2], proteins [3], species [4], companies [5], and so on) are linked by connections that are present or absent depending on the node relations we are interested in. In the case of the Internet and of the WWW, what is a connection is clear, being cables or hyperlinks. In other cases, connections can depend on the definition: for example, we may say that proteins interact if they physically stick to each other, or if one of the two promotes the expression of the other. Species interact by predation in food webs, and in the case of companies one possible relation is given by the companies' portfolio. Social relations between individuals can be of many kinds and purposes, from business[7–9] to mutual assistance [10] to friendships and others. The choice of the type of relation defines the network and its structure, but we need also the strength of the connections to fully characterize the network. In the social context, for example, the strength of a relation is important to determine which is the best route to pass information to or gather information from somebody else in the system. Strong social ties may be regarded as preferential and reliable information channels.

All the above networks present the small-world property, i.e., the average distance between nodes grows only logarithmically with the size of the network. As such, small-world networks are usually considered optimal to distribute or collect information. Yet, whenever some of the connections become unreliable, the effective average distance can become rather large [11]. In this respect, the reliability of a connection, and ultimately the robustness of the network, can be assessed by the strength of various connections. The most recent studies indeed complement the attention to the network topology with an investigation on the weights of edges [5,6]. Yet, although the weights of the connections are clearly very important, their determination is a difficult task. Indeed, it is relatively easy to decide whether two individuals are connected or not (since the existence of a link between them is essentially a binary variable). Instead, it is much more

difficult to quantify the strength of such a connection. How can we measure in an objective way how much two people are, for example, friends to each other? Here we show that for e-mail networks (a particular instance of social network) such a measure is possible. We believe that this example provides clues to the mechanism by which the network connections form, develop, and strengthen. We also introduce a model, based on the idea of *preferential exchange*, whose applicability can in principle be extended to other contexts.

Modern computer networks are inherently social networks, since they link people and organizations and allow the exchange of information and communications [12]. In particular, the exchange of e-mails between people defines a paradigmatic example of computer-supported social network that is the object of many recent studies [12–16]. In e-mail networks, a link between two people is established whenever they exchange an e-mail (or a threshold number of e-mails [14]). By browsing the e-mail folders of an individual (each folder represents a different e-mail sender), it is easy to check that, after a few years, the number of connections for the average person can grow to the hundreds. A careful analysis of the network is therefore necessary to reveal the presence of groups with common interests and purposes and the hierarchical organization of these groups [14,17].

We introduce an objective measure of the strength of the relations by keeping track of the number of e-mails received from a given sender in somebody's e-mail directory. The datasets that we analyze are five e-mail directories coming from our accounts and the accounts of two other colleagues. They contain 5628 e-mails (corresponding to 393 senders) collected over roughly three years, 19 219 e-mails (476 senders, ten years), 16 102 e-mails (113 senders, three years), 13 385 e-mails (516 senders, five years), and 21 782 e-mails (207 senders, five years). Figure 1 shows the normalized histograms of the number $N(k)$ of people who wrote k e-mails to us and our colleagues. As can be seen, they are quite similar, and they can be approximated by an algebraic behavior of the kind $N(k) \sim k^{-\gamma}$ with $\gamma \sim 1.6$. Although, of course,




FIG. 1. Log-log representation of the e-mail distribution in five sets of folders (empty circles, full squares, and other symbols). They are remarkably similar to each other, hinting towards some form of universality. Data have been exponentially binned to reduce noise. The straight line is a power law $k^{-1.6}$.

the five datasets contain some common acquaintances, they are mostly uncorrelated, so that we consider them to be well representative of the same universal behavior.

An algebraic law, rather than a simple exponential, is usually a symptom of the presence of some form of correlations in the dynamical process that produced the data. How do correlations arise in this context? A very simple mechanism that is known to produce such correlations is a form of positive feedback that, in the social context, can be described as “good partners become better partners.” Stated otherwise, there is a reinforcement mechanism such that if the relation between two people is already strong, it has more chances to become even stronger.

To check whether this mechanism allows for the creation and reinforcement of social links in such a way as to reproduce the empirical data, we have analyzed a very simple model. Starting from a society of S_0 individuals, at every time step each of them sends to the others M_{out} e-mail messages, at random. The network of acquaintances grows in time, and at every time step a new individual enters the society. The probability that individual j sends a message to individual i is proportional to the number $k(i \rightarrow j)$ of e-mails that j ever received from i , that is,

$$p(j \rightarrow i) = \frac{k(i \rightarrow j)}{\sum_l k(l \rightarrow j)} \quad (1)$$

(the sum in the denominator is the total number of e-mails ever received by j). We assigned to this rule the name of *preferential exchange*. In some respect, this choice is reminiscent of the idea of preferential attachment in the formation of growing scale-free networks [18], even if, as we discuss in the following, the physical meaning is rather different. More generally, the preferential exchange is also close in spirit to the tit-for-tat reciprocity strategy believed to be an important ingredient to explain the emergence of cooperation and altruism between individuals [19].

Figure 2 shows the results of simulations with $S_0=2$, followed for 1998 time steps, to a final size of $S=2000$ individuals; at every time step each individual sends out M_{out}




FIG. 2. Log-log representation of the e-mail distribution of two random individuals of the model, with $S_0=2$, $S=2000$, and $M_{\text{out}}=100$. The best power-law fit yields an exponent 1.8(2) (straight line).

=100 e-mails. As a starting condition, we assume that every new individual has already exchanged one e-mail with everybody else: thus, the structure of the e-mail network is trivial, being fully connected. The e-mail distributions of random individuals in the population are very similar to each other and all exhibit the same algebraic behavior $N(k) \sim k^{-\gamma}$ with an exponent $\gamma \sim 1.8(2)$. Noticeably, the result does not depend on the choice of the above parameters.

The solution of the model can be obtained also analytically, by means of a few approximations that allow for the identification of the parameters relevant for the model. Indeed, it is possible to write a rate equation for $k(j \rightarrow i, t)$,

$$\frac{dk(i \rightarrow j)}{dt} = M_{\text{out}} p(j \rightarrow i) = M_{\text{out}} \frac{k(i \rightarrow j)}{\sum_l k(l \rightarrow j)}. \quad (2)$$

We assume that an individual receives e-mails at a constant rate M_{in} , so that the denominator on the r.h.s. of Eq. (2) grows linearly in time: $M_{\text{in}} t$. We have verified this linear dependence on time in our simulations, finding furthermore that $M_{\text{in}} \approx M_{\text{out}}$. Moreover, we assume that there is reciprocity in the e-mail exchange, that is, the number of e-mails that i ever sent to j is proportional to the number of e-mails that j ever sent to i . This allows us to replace the numerator of the r.h.s. of Eq. (2) using $k(i \rightarrow j) = R k(j \rightarrow i)$. We have verified also this proportionality in our simulations, finding $R \approx 1$, an indication of the so-called *fair reciprocity*. With these assumptions, the rate equation simplifies to

$$\frac{dk(j \rightarrow i, t)}{dt} = \alpha \frac{k(j \rightarrow i, t)}{t} \quad (3)$$

with $\alpha = R(M_{\text{out}}/M_{\text{in}})$. The solution of Eq. (3) is

$$k(j \rightarrow i, t) = \left(\frac{t}{t_0} \right)^\alpha. \quad (4)$$

If t_i (t_j) is the time at which individual i (j) entered the society, we set $t_0 = \max(t_i, t_j)$ (and of course $t_0 < t$). If j is younger than i , then $t_0 = t_j$ and we can invert the solution (4) to obtain

$$t_j = t[k(j \rightarrow i)]^{-1/\alpha}. \quad (5)$$

Equation (5) sets a one-to-one relation between t_j and $k(j \rightarrow i)$ that allows us to use the probability conservation relation $N(k)dk = \rho(t)dt$, where $\rho(t) = \text{const}$, because new individuals are added at a constant rate. Therefore, we have that $N(k) \sim k^{-\gamma}$ with $\gamma = 1 + (M_{\text{in}}/M_{\text{out}})/R$. If, on the contrary, j is older than i , then $t_0 = t_i$ and these folders should contribute to a peak of $N(k)$ at $k = (t/t_i)^\alpha$ independent of j . We do not observe this peak in our simulations: if we split the histogram of individual i into the two contributions of people older and younger than i , we find that they show the same algebraic behavior (data not shown). This is due to the mean-field nature of the above calculations. Fluctuations, therefore, have been neglected. This does not apply in the real situation where they are enhanced by the positive feedback mechanism. As a consequence, their combined effect drives the system to the same distribution $N(k)$ for individuals both younger and older than i . In the case of perfect reciprocity ($R=1$) and if people reply to every e-mail they receive ($M_{\text{in}}/M_{\text{out}}=1$), then the value of the exponent $\gamma=2$, close to the results from our simulations.

Actually, some of the approximations that we made can be safely relaxed. In particular, we might assume that, depending on their personality, some people have a tendency to write slightly more e-mails than they receive, i.e., $M_{\text{out}}/M_{\text{in}} > 1$, or vice versa (although very large or very small values are unreasonable and we expect real values to be close to 1); also, reciprocity could be imperfect, always for personality reasons, and $R \neq 1$ (but again very large or small values are unreasonable; this has been again verified in our simulations). In these cases, we can expect variations of the exponent γ (although nothing forbids large variations of this exponent, our expectations are that the exponents should always be close to 2, as the data in Fig. 1 show). Changing the values of S , S_0 , and M_{out} does not change the results in our simulation.

Our model, based on the *preferential exchange* ingredient, reproduces rather nicely the behavior of the data for a large range of parameter values. As previously observed, this mechanism is similar to the preferential attachment model proposed by Barabási and Albert [18] to explain the emergence of the scale-free topology of some networks. The mathematical similarity extends also to some other results: if, for example, the preferential exchange rate equation is modified so that the numerator on the r.h.s. of Eq. (2) becomes $k(i \rightarrow j)^\alpha$, then the e-mail distribution becomes a stretched exponential, as it happens in the context of network topology [21].

Nevertheless, relevant differences between the two rules appear when considering the nature of social networks. First, preferential exchange works on a local basis, which means that two people can increase the strength of their link ignoring what is happening to the other links. Instead, in the preferential attachment model the newcomers need full knowledge of the network degrees in order to decide their connectivity. Secondly, and more importantly, the rate of change of the e-mails that individual i receives from j depends only on the number of e-mails that traveled in the

opposite direction and on the total number of messages that j ever received (both local quantities available to the two people). Therefore, preferential exchange is intrinsically *symmetric*, while preferential attachment divides the topology of the network in hubs and poorly connected nodes. In summary, this is a symmetrically cooperative model where no global information is necessary.

Interestingly, more data have recently emerged about the connection strengths in scientific collaborations networks [22], airport traffic [6], and other systems, showing that the measured strengths are indeed power-law, or at least fat-tail, distributed. Networks often evolve through relations that get stronger in time thanks to positive feedback, that is, the more an individual (in the social context) has given to another one, the more the latter is likely to give back in return. Moreover, many networks also grow in time. Implementing these ingredients in a simple model reproduces nicely the qualitative (algebraic) behavior that we observe in real e-mail data. The quantitative agreement is obtained when we add good reciprocity: the exchange is a “fair” process. We believe that these ingredients do indeed shape social and other networks, and the e-mail network, as a particular example, is extremely suited to provide us with a wealth of data that could be difficult to gather for other networks (it has been found recently that in a sample of mailboxes at the HP Laboratories, the median number of e-mails was 2200, indicating that a large amount of data could be, in principle, available for analysis [20]). Moreover, we still neglected the interplay between the dynamics over the network, and the network structure itself, whereas we expect, in principle, that the two should co-evolve toward some stationary state.

At the same time, we expect that in most real situations this model could be refined by introducing a more detailed description of the process of interaction. For example, a large variability in people’s attitude could be captured by defining a local intrinsic quantity shaping the mechanism, of link reinforcement. As in the case of the preferential attachment mechanism, such generalization does not remove the power-law nature of the probability distributions involved [23–26], but rather qualifies the kind of critical processes going on in the system. Further work is needed in this direction, and more data about the structure of networks and the strength of the connections should be made available to develop and validate models.

From a more general point of view, e-mail networks on one hand, and simulations on the other, can help investigate the large-scale consequences of fairness and reciprocity: these two ingredients are often deemed as determinant in shaping social relations, yet their effects are usually studied for small groups of people and short times. The use of computers, both as data resources and as simulation tools, can easily bring these studies to large scales.

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